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Conflict over the past few decades has changed drastically. Warfare changed 
with the conflict. Large-scale conventional wars are not today‘s norm. Small non-
state actors and terrorist organizations cause havoc on a global scale using 
unconventional methods and weapons. The United States and its allies need to 
combat these threats using indirect strategies while maintaining international 
legitimacy.  
Hizbullah is a terrorist organization operating within Lebanon and the 
Levant. Hizbullah employs violence, in addition to political means, to achieve its 
goals. Lebanon and its allies could identify a strategic internal defense and 
development strategy and implement a comprehensive foreign internal defense 
training regimen to combat Hizbullah and ultimately disarm the militant wing. 
Using an indirect method, focusing on a political agreement, increasing social 
services and providing additional security and stability to southern Lebanon are 
some of the critical elements the Lebanese government needs to implement to 
tame Hizbullah and disarm the terrorists. This approach worked for Britain with 
the Irish Republican Army and it can work for Lebanon with Hizbullah if properly 
implemented.  
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Conflict over the past few decades has changed drastically, especially in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Warfare changed with 
the conflicts. Large-scale conventional wars are no longer the norm in today‘s 
conflicts. Small non-state actors and terrorist organizations train, operate and 
supply themselves and then they attack states, armies and alliances in a non-
traditional manner. The United States and its allies need to combat these 
practices in a similar manner while still maintaining legitimacy and abiding by the 
laws of war and armed conflict. 
Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, dated 8 November 2010, defines Irregular Warfare as:  
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 
range of militarily and other capacities, in order to erode an 
adversary‘s power, influence and will.1  
The same publication defines Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as 
―Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the 
action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free 
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and 
other threats to its security.‖2  
The increased conflict of our allies and their adversaries—Lebanon and 
Hizbullah,3 Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Columbia and the Revolutionary Armed 
                                            
1 Headquarters, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office, 
2010), 170. 
2 Ibid., 128. 
3 Hizbullah will be spelled as such throughout the paper, regardless of author or source. This 
is consistent with the International Journal of Middle East Studies and is done to maintain 
consistency throughout the paper. 
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Forces of Colombia—People‘s Army (FARC), etc., have tested and strained the 
training and resources provided by the United States and its allies. Using the 
tried and true lessons of foreign internal defense, coupled with new methods of 
training in irregular warfare, the U.S. and allies will be more capable of thwarting 
attacks from adversaries. The goal of this irregular warfare centric foreign internal 
defense approach is to make our allies capable and confident of deterring threats 
in their country and from outside sources.  
Lebanon is a small country located in the eastern Mediterranean, 
bordered in the north and east by Syria, in the west by the Mediterranean Sea 
and in the south by Israel. Lebanon received its independence from France in 
1943, and underwent a civil war from 1975–1990, which devastated the country. 
Lebanon is almost as big as the state of Connecticut, and has a population of just 
over four million people.4 Based on information from Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-
based research firm, the current population is approximately 54 percent Muslim 
and 46 percent Christian, and separated into 18 different religious sects.5 The 
three heads of the government come from different religious backgrounds so 
each sect is represented fairly. Lebanon has a free-market economy worth about 
62 billion dollars.6  
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is comprised of three different 
branches of service—Army, Navy and Air Force. There are approximately 72,000 
active personnel employed by the LAF. The majority of these are in the Army.  
Hizbullah is a Shi‘a Islamic group that has a political, social and militant 
wing in Lebanon. Hizbullah in Arabic means ―Party of God.‖ Hizbullah has been 
active in parliament for many years, and it recently became a recognized 
                                            
4 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 
2010, accessed May 25, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148830.htm. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Lebanon, Central Intelligence Agency fact book, last modified May 7, 2013, 
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html. 
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member of the Lebanese government in June 2011. Hizbullah can trace its roots 
back to the 1982 invasion by Israel during the Lebanese Civil War.  
This thesis examines a small portion of possible ways to discredit 
Hizbullah and strengthen the government of Lebanon. In order for Lebanon to 
discredit and disarm Hizbullah, many complicated and interwoven political, 
military and economic aspects must be addressed. Lebanon must assume a 
whole of government approach when dealing with Hizbullah.  
The Lebanese government has the critical role in advancing its country‘s 
goals and objectives and providing basic services for the population. Hizbullah 
currently provides an enormous amount of social services support in southern 
Lebanon to the Shi‘a minority. The government needs to assume this role from 
Hizbullah, ensuring there is no lapse in support. International support and aid is 
instrumental in kick-starting any social support Lebanon provides to populations 
under the care of Hizbullah. Lebanon and its allies need to determine effective 
ways to minimize support Hizbullah receives from countries deemed to be a 
threat to security and stability, namely Iran and Syria. 
The Lebanese military, through rigorous training, needs to increase its 
effectiveness and professionalism. Security and stability in the southern border 
region with Israel needs to be assumed from Hizbullah and maintained through 
robust presence and participation with the Lebanese population residing in the 
area. The LAF is critical in maintaining security and stability within Lebanon as 
well as advancing and implementing the policies of the national government.  
Hizbullah is deeply embedded within the political, security and economic 
framework of Lebanon. Hizbullah receives international support from Iran and 
Syria and provides needed assistance to the minority population. This assistance 
is well organized and efficient. The militant wing of Hizbullah provides security in 
the southern border region. The political wing is a recognized element within the 
government. Hizbullah is very well established and will be difficult to eliminate.  
 4 
This thesis examines the capabilities needed to produce an effective FID 
and internal defense and development (IDAD) program to discredit the militant 
wing of Hizbullah. This program will increase the effectiveness of the LAF and 
assist it in becoming a more professional military force capable of countering 
Hizbullah‘s actions. The FID program, coupled with the IDAD strategy developed 
by the Lebanese government, has the potential to address other areas within 
Hizbullah such as social services and support from international partners. 
Lebanon will not be able to defeat Hizbullah if it continues to receive support from 
Iran, Syria and the local Shi‘a in southern Lebanon. The FID program is one 
element necessary in the complex solution required to defeat Hizbullah.  
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate current U.S. FID efforts 
undertaken with foreign allies, and determine if an irregular warfare centric or 
indirect approach can increase the effects of that nation in combatting its internal 
and external threats. This thesis specifically evaluates efforts the U.S. takes with 
Lebanon and Hizbullah.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can an irregular warfare-centric foreign internal defense program increase 
the effectiveness of the Lebanese Armed Forces to counter Hizbullah?  
D. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
From personal experience working with the Lebanese Armed Forces, I 
understand the kinds of problems preventing the LAF from effectively countering 
Hizbullah. Most units conducting FID with the LAF implement an infantry-based 
or conventional approach to training. The training is conducted this way because 
the Lebanese units operate under the rules of the laws of war and deploy using 




traditional manner. The United States classified Hizbullah as a terrorist 
organization, and most terrorist organizations follow their own credo and modus 
operandi.  
During previous training missions, the primary objective for the United 
States Special Forces (USSF) team members has been to train as many soldiers 
as possible in the allotted time. Selected team members conducted a preliminary 
meeting with the Lebanese commanding officer prior to the completion of mission 
planning and team deployment. During the mission planning with the unit‘s 
commander, he made it clear his primary objective was to train as many men as 
possible. His follow-up concern was how many rounds and what types of 
ammunition we would supply for the training event. The commanding officer 
requested regular reports on the level of training and the number of rounds of 
ammunition that his men were firing. This prevented the USSF team from 
conducting training which focused on more indirect ways to counter the threats, 
specifically Hizbullah, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could encounter.  
Hizbullah is a strong and effective organization operating within Lebanon. 
It has an established command and control hierarchy, separate military, social 
services and political sections and benefits from international support from Iran 
and Syria. Max Weber says, ―A state is a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.‖7 Based on this statement, Hizbullah is preventing the LAF from 
defending and protecting the interests of Lebanon, ultimately preventing Lebanon 
from exercising its sovereign right to statehood. This thesis will examine ways 
foreign internal defense efforts undertaken by USSF soldiers can be expanded to 
increase the effectiveness of the LAF and its allies against threats which 
undermine the essence of Lebanese statehood.  
                                            
7 Max Weber, ―Politics As A Vocation,‖ (lecture, Free Students Union, Munich University, 
January 1919), retrieved from http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-
Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf  
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E. SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research for this thesis was conducted in three areas: Lebanon and 
Hizbullah, FID and asymmetric conflict and historical case studies. The research 
established a baseline understanding of the history, problems (social, economic, 
political, etc.) and previously- implemented programs by Lebanon and Hizbullah.  
Richard Norton and Judith Harik‘s books on Hizbullah provided the 
majority of the information used to understand and frame Lebanon and 
Hizbullah‘s complicated and intertwined histories. As pre-eminent authors on the 
subject, the books provided a great deal of depth and specifics with regards to 
the creation of Lebanon and Hizbullah and the military, political and social 
conflicts plaguing the two elements. Both authors provide a detailed recounting of 
the original birth of Hizbullah and the players and members associated with the 
creation and maintenance of the organization throughout the years. Military 
conflicts and political victories and defeats are outlined using the international 
events of the Levant and greater Middle East for additional emphasis and 
background. The authors focus heavily on the vital social service wing of 
Hizbullah, which provides support to the local Shi‘a minority, support the 
Lebanese government has been slower to provide.  
James Love focused his writing and research on the social services 
capability of Hizbullah. His argument claims, the socials services provided by 
Hizbullah is most important. The arm of Hizbullah provides critical services, such 
as food, clean water, access to medical facilities, education, etc., to the 
improvised and minority Shi‘a populations of southern Lebanon. Without these 
critical services, Hizbullah would not have the base of support and unhindered 
access to the population it needs to remain relevant and successful within 
Lebanon and the Levant. 
Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguín-Toft and Patricia Sullivan focus their 
independent research on how big nations lose wars against small states or non-
state actors. Mack concludes conventional military superiority does not 
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necessarily prevail in modern war and success for the insurgents stems from the 
withering political support and capability to wage war by the big nation.8 
Arreguín-Toft concludes strong actors (or big states) lose when they adopt the 
wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversary. The proper strategy, whether it 
is direct (attacking an adversary‘s armed forces and capacity to fight), or indirect 
(attacking an adversary‘s will to fight), must be employed by the strong actor in 
order to ensure victory.9 Sullivan concluded strong states lose when they 
underestimate the cost of attaining war aims and initiate conflicts they cannot 
sustain to victory.10 This research all points to the same general conclusion: in 
order for a strong nation to defeat a weaker nation or non-state actor, the 
stronger nation must implement a strategy, direct or indirect, focusing on the 
strengths of the adversary, while simultaneously maintaining popular public 
opinion for the conflict.  
Joint Publication 3-22 (FID) is the current U.S. doctrine on FID, which is 
intimately linked to the IDAD strategy. A proper IDAD strategy, included in a 
comprehensive FID training regime, is crucial for successful U.S. training 
programs with foreign allies and combating small-state and non-state actors 
through indirect means.  
In the case study chapter, the thesis relied heavily on Louise Richardson 
and Thomas Henriksen for the information on Britain and the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), and Scott Mann for the information on Afghanistan and the Village 
Stability Operations (VSO). Initially, the British combated the IRA using an 
intense heavy-handed approach. This was unsuccessful and led to the Bloody 
Sunday massacre in 1972. Following the massacre, the British changed their 
tactics and focused on addressing the grievances of the Catholics, namely in 
                                            
8 Andrew Mack, ―Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict‖ 
World Politics, 27. (Jan 1975): 177. 
9 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, ―How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,‖ 
International Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 105 
10 Patricia Sullivan, ―Who Wins? Determinants of strategic success and failure in war‖ 
(lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 2, 2013). 
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political, employment, housing and educational areas. This indirect approach, 
coupled with negotiations between both parties, led to a peace agreement and 
the disarming of the IRA. 
In Afghanistan, USSF implemented a bottom-up approach to combating 
the Taliban. The soldiers lived with and protected the Pashtun population living in 
remote villages far removed from the central government in Kabul. USSF are 
able to bring stability to the region by training and employing local Afghan police 
forces and re-establishing the local elders to their positions of authority within the 
villages. This bottom-up approach is contradictory to the top-down approach 
higher levels of U.S. government and military are attempting to implement with 
the central government. Both approaches are necessary and stability and 
security are attained when the two approaches are implemented simultaneously 
and meet in the middle. Conditions necessary for VSO to succeed are outlined in 
a later chapter, but it should be noted that VSO is not universally successful in 
Afghanistan.  
Using these sources of expertise, it is the intention of this thesis to expand 
upon previous thoughts of asymmetric conflict and examine the indirect approach 
to countering Hizbullah. A close comparison will be made to the two case studies 
and parallels will be drawn connecting the conflicts. Recommendations for how 
the LAF can marginalize Hizbullah will be presented at the end of the thesis.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a case-study methodology to demonstrate how the U.S. 
can use a more effective approach to countering Hizbullah‘s influence in 
Lebanon. Current FID and IDAD concepts the United States is using to train 
foreign allies will be carefully analyzed in an attempt to incorporate irregular 
warfare (IW) doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures into FID 
implementation strategies.  
Analysis of historical case studies where an indirect approach was used 
against an adversary is also conducted. These approaches will be weighed 
 9 
against current FID doctrine. The goal is to increase the capabilities of the units 
receiving this enhanced FID training in order to be more effective in countering 
and combatting internal and external threats to the state. Specifically, what 
capabilities are more likely to propel the Lebanese government and armed forces 
towards victory against Hizbullah?  
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II conducts a study of Lebanon and Hizbullah. Chapter III 
evaluates ways to counter Hizbullah and reviews the current U.S. FID and IDAD 
concepts. Chapter IV reviews the case studies of Great Britain and the IRA and 
Afghanistan and VSO, where an indirect approach was successful. Chapter V 
offers recommendations and concluding remarks.  
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In order for Lebanon, to counter Hizbullah, it will have to take an indirect 
approach in its efforts. Hizbullah has a long history in Lebanon and is deeply 
rooted within the political and social framework of the country. The following 
chapter briefly reviews the contemporary histories of Lebanon and Hizbullah. 
A. LEBANON 
During the 1920s, the French exploited their League of Nations mandates 
and carved generous chunks of Syria to create a ―greater Lebanon.‖ Lebanon 
remained this way until 1943 when it won its independence from France. The 
Maronite Christians, the favored ally of political and economic France, had to 
contend with Lebanon being an Arab state and not an appendage of Europe.11 
There are 18 recognized sects within Lebanon with the three most populous 
being the Maronite Christians, the Sunni Muslims and the Shi‘a Muslims. The 
three highest political positions in the Lebanese government are held by these 
three popular sects—presidency to the Maronites, premiership to the Sunnis and 
speakership of the parliament to the Shi‘a. These positions were based on the 
last official census conducted in Lebanon in 1932.12  
The more powerful Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims lived in the 
high-end neighborhoods of Beirut and the fertile and economically prosperous 
areas of northern Lebanon. The poorer and more disadvantaged Shi‘a lived in 
the southern slums of Beirut, the southern lands of Lebanon next to Israel and 
the Beqaa Valley. This geographic divide exasperated the division between the 
sects that had wealth and advancement opportunities and those that did not. 
Poverty, despair and resentment flourished in the areas where the Shi‘a 
population resided. Throughout the period from independence to the civil war, the 
                                            
11 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah, A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 11. 
12 Ibid., 11–12. 
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Shi‘a population grew and worked mostly as subsistence farmers. The average 
size of a Shi‘a family quickly outpaced that of their rival sects, the Sunni Muslims 
and Maronite Christians.13 This increase in population and resentment towards 
other sects paved the way for the emergence of fundamental Shi‘a organizations 
determined to implement change in the society, country and region.  
B. RISE IN SHI’A ACTIVISM AND THE BEGINNING OF HIZBULLAH 
Several factors influenced the increase in activism among the Shi‘a 
including: larger families, increased numbers of Palestinian refugees flooding into 
southern Lebanon after the creation of Israel in 1948, and armed guerrillas from 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who came to Lebanon in large 
numbers after being expelled from Jordan following the 1970–71 ―Black 
September‖ events.14 These were just a few factors which ultimately led to the 
political rise of the Shi‘a within Lebanon and their interaction with neighboring 
countries.  
Throughout the 1950–1970s, young Shi‘a men and women were attracted 
to secular opposition parties (e.g., Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Lebanese 
Communist Party) for the promise of radical change within Lebanon and the 
region. This movement towards radical change continued right up until the start 
of the civil war in 1975, with other opposition parties such as Amal (1974) and 
Hizbullah (1982), being the late arrivals to the resistance movement. Instrumental 
in this change was Musa al-Sadr. Known as Imam Musa, he was vocal in 
increasing the rights, privileges and quality of life for ordinary Shi‘a and reducing 
the power of the traditional Shi‘a elites. Imam Musa was also keenly aware of the 




                                            
13 Norton, Hezbollah, A Short History, 13. 
14 Ibid., 14.  
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the presidency. He was critical of the Christian community and he argued that the 
Maronite-dominated government neglected southern Lebanon where a majority 
of the Shi‘a lived.15  
On June 5, 1982 Israel crossed the border into southern Lebanon and 
invaded the country following an 11-month ceasefire with the PLO. This invasion, 
coupled with the growing Shi‘a resentment within Lebanon and the Islamic 
Revolution exported from Iran gave birth to Hizbullah and their resistance 
elements. Iran is credited with the creation of Hizbullah. Syria and Iran allied in 
1980 with each country mutually benefiting from the relationship and as such 
Syria did not oppose the creation of Hizbullah. The emulation of the Islamic 
Revolution and the increased monetary and military support from Iran ensured 
they were the primary backers of Hizbullah.16  
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah‘s Secretary-General, was 22 years old 
when Hizbullah was founded in 1982. He (and other members of the young cadre 
of leaders) maintained momentum for the organization through the early 1980s, 
rising throughout the ranks and gaining more prominence throughout the years. It 
was not until the latter half of the 1980s that Hizbullah existed as a coherent 
organization. Throughout this time, Hizbullah maintained close ties with the al-
Asad regime in Damascus and the religious leadership in Iran.17 
C. HIZBULLAH’S STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
Hizbullah is organized into a higher headquarters and is supported by 
three branches—political, military and social. The Israeli invasion of 1982 created 
the need for a structured resistance organization. Hizbullah based its 
organization on Mao‘s three phases of guerrilla war. The first phase was building 
and maintaining popular support, which equates to the social services section. 
The second phase is the engagement in guerrilla warfare to resist the oppressor, 
                                            
15 Norton, Hezbollah, A Short History, 14–19. 
16 Ibid., 32–33. 
17 Ibid., 34–35.  
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which equates to the military section. The third phase is the execution of a 
political and military campaign to complete the conquest, which equates to the 
political section.18 Love writes, ―In 2004, Hizbullah‘s Deputy Secretary General, 
Shaykh Naim Qassem, categorized the organization‘s vision into the three pillars 
of Hizbullah: Islam as a model for governance, the obligation of jihad and the 
jurisdiction of the jurist theologian or velayat-i faqih.‖19 Hizbullah has changed its 
ideological platform over the years to maintain its relevancy within Lebanon and 
the greater Levant region. Initially, the organization was focused on military and 
social activities. Throughout the years, and in response to the evolving conflicts, 
Hizbullah increased its political power and representation in local government. 
Social services continued to increase and military actions adjusted due to the 
threats. Hizbullah altered its ideology after its inclusion on the U.S. terrorist 
organization list and most recently again after its inclusion into the Lebanese 
parliament in June 2011.  
Arguably, the most important section within Hizbullah is the social services 
section, though it is often overshadowed by the actions of the militant wing. Early 
in Hizbullah‘s existence it was shown that the members of this fundamentalist 
organization truly cared for the disadvantaged Shi‘a population. The organization 
provides food, clean water, medical care, building and infrastructure construction 
and reconstruction daily and quickly after periods of conflict. The organization 
caught the world‘s attention after the 2006 war when it provided immediate 
assistance to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts without the knowledge or 
assistance of the Lebanese government. ―Waiting for the state to come has 
proved futile‖ said, Abu Mahdi, an engineer from the Jihad al-Binaa Development 
Group (a Hizbullah organization).20 Hizbullah owes much of its appeal to its 
ability to provide faster and more services in Muslim areas. This is used as a 
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means to underline and enhance its legitimacy as a political organization rather 
than trying to change Lebanon‘s pluralist system.21 Hizbullah has created 
organizations focusing on the welfare of people killed, wounded, or martyred 
while fighting Israel such as the Martyr‘s Foundation, Foundation for the 
Wounded and Women‘s Association. They have founded youth organizations, 
such as Imam al-Mahdi Scouts and have successfully marginalized the 
Lebanese Department of Education with its own education branch.22  
It is estimated that social services account for more than 50 percent of 
Hizbullah‘s annual budget, with Iran suspected of contributing hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually to support the social services section in addition to 
weapons and training for the military wing.23 Hezbollah has an extensive network 
of legitimate business to match Syrian and Iranian funds; however, the 
expectations of the population could be Hizbullah‘s ruin if they cannot provide the 
required support. Hizbullah raises additional income from expatriate populations, 
illegal activity and charity organizations.24  
D. HIZBULLAH’S USE OF VIOLENCE AND ITS REBUTTAL 
During the 1980s, Israel and Lebanon continued to have cross-border 
altercations while the civil war within Lebanon raged on. Hizbullah increased its 
use of violence resulting in increased civilian and military deaths. Because of the 
violence, the political agenda of Hizbullah was called into question by the United 
States, other Western countries and countries throughout the Middle East. The 
violence perpetrated against the United States and French installations in 
Lebanon during this time was unsettling to most Christians and Muslims based 
on ethical grounds. Shadowy Shiite fundamentalist groups claimed responsibility 
for these acts of violence; Hizbullah never claimed responsibility directly. 
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However, French and American intelligence claimed Hizbullah, backed by Iran, 
was responsible for the terror attacks, but no concrete evidence was ever 
produced or presented to solidify the claim. Portions of society in Lebanon 
thought Hizbullah and other Shiite fundamentalist groups were positioning 
themselves to force an Islamic political agenda onto the multi-confessional 
society.25 Understanding the ramifications of these claims, and the direction 
public perception was heading, Hizbullah sent an open letter to a Beirut 
newspaper in 1985 outlining its position.  
The letter presented major policy positions for military and political jihad 
based on Hizbullah‘s point of view. Harik wrote, ―A close reading of the missive 
illustrated that Hizbullah expressed moderate political goals at the very same 
time as maximum efforts were being made to mobilize Shiites around a radical 
Islamic Agenda.‖26 The letter was divided into four parts—identity, struggle, 
objectives and a ‗word to the Christians.‘ It claimed that Hizbullah was not a 
closed organization, but a society linked to the Muslims of the world. The letter 
claims the United States is the major ―abomination‖ along with its allies and the 
aims of its jihad are expelling the Americans and its allies from Lebanon and 
punishing the Christians for crimes committed against the Christians and 
Muslims during the civil war.27 The letter continues to say, the superpowers of 
the world and the government of Lebanon were corrupt and Hizbullah fought 
under the banner of Islam. Hizbullah did not dictate a precise political design for 
Lebanon, instead saying that once the infidels have been removed from the 
country the people would be free to choose a political system without any outside 
pressure. Hizbullah hoped the political system would be Islamic-based or even 
clerical in nature. The letter also addressed the use of violence by Hizbullah as, 
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―each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us 
undertakes his task in the battle in accordance within his lawful assignment.28   
As the violence continued in Lebanon in the 1980s, Hizbullah was referred 
to as a terrorist organization more frequently and was placed on the United 
States terrorist list in 1997, when the list was created. Hizbullah continued to 
define its role in Lebanon with regards to Syria, Israel and Amal. Hizbullah denies 
conducting the attacks that killed American, French and Lebanese civilians, but 
were not upset when foreign forces and individuals departed Lebanon. 
In 1989, Saudi Arabia negotiated a peace accord to end the Lebanese 
civil war, which became known as the Ta‘if accord. This accord brought the civil 
war to a close and re-arranged the political basis in the Parliament with a 50–50 
split between the Muslims and the Christians. The accord also called for Lebanon 
to take control of southern Lebanon from Israel. Hizbullah maintained its military 
posture by calling its forces ―Islamic resistance‖ groups- not militias- which were 
committed to ending Israel‘s occupation of southern Lebanon.29 Continued 
conflict persisted between Israel and Hizbullah throughout the 1990s and during 
the eventual 2000 withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon. Hizbullah 
remained active in the security zone to protect southern Lebanon and prevent 
any altercations between Lebanon, Israel and the South Lebanon Army, based 
on the pretext the withdrawal was never fully completed.30 Hizbullah had to be 
careful during this time period to ensure they were not labeled as terrorists or 
aggressors, but as a legitimate resistance force committed to the removal of 
Israel from southern Lebanon.31 The Lebanese people were supportive of 
Hizbullah during this time due to the added security and social services Hizbullah 
provided, as well as support they received from Syria. The analysis of political 
affiliations of members of the Lebanese government from 1992–2000 revealed 
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that the men were highly reliable Syrian allies.32 Hizbullah, since then, 
maintained the support of the local Shi‘a, but have alienated itself from other 
religious sects not in line with its ideology. 
E. HIZBULLAH AND THE CURRENT GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
Hizbullah returned to the public spotlight in 2001. After the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001 (9–11), President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 
detailing the actions necessary to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Hizbullah 
was not on the list of terrorist organizations with a ―global reach,‖ and this 
angered Israel. Eventually, the directive was amended to include Hizbullah as an 
enemy in the ―war against terrorism.‖33 Hizbullah has its own agenda, mostly a 
domestic one. It includes the removal of Israel from southern Lebanon and the 
removal of Western influence from the Middle East. Hizbullah does have some 
operations occurring elsewhere, but the majority is within the Levant. This small 
footprint did not cause alarm for the U.S. government after 9–11. After pressure 
from Israel, Hizbullah was included in the list of terrorist organizations outlined in 
Executive Order 13224. The United States wanted global support, to include 
Muslim support, for its impending actions in the global war. Groups such as al-
Qaeda have cells located in many countries and the United States wanted to 
ensure the best possible outcome from the conflict.  
Countries were presented with demands and Lebanon, Iran and Syria 
were no different—essentially sovereign nations are allies of the United States or 
they are not. Some of the demands were met and some were not. All three 
countries needed the support Hizbullah provided to maintain pressure on Israel. 
They considered Hizbullah to be a resistance organization similar to those that 
fought against colonialism. The Geneva Convention of 1949 gave a country the 
right to resist a foreign occupation force. Lebanon claimed Hizbullah was just that 
resistance force and would not freeze its bank assets to appease the United 
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States. Israel claimed they are not occupiers but protectors, protecting their 
border from incursions. Israel said it would leave the security zone if the 
Lebanese Army took over security and disbanded Hizbullah.34    
Hizbullah maintained its security posture in southern Lebanon in the early 
2000s, and tried to distance itself even further from the United States‘ crosshairs 
on the verge of the U.S.-led Iraqi invasion.35 Hizbullah made an early strategic 
decision to exclude acts of terror and violence against civilians and civilian 
infrastructure when conducting operations. This prevented them from 
immediately being branded a terrorist organization. Hizbullah has maintained true 
to this conviction by conducting guerrilla warfare, wearing uniforms and attacking 
military targets. Attacking civilian targets and infrastructure would not advance 
their political agenda or jihad against Israel.36 In reality, Hizbullah has not been 
100 percent true to this decision, but they strive to maintain their position. 
Hizbullah has been able to achieve some of their goals and advance others due 
to this commitment. 
According to JP 1–02 terrorism is defined as, ―The unlawful use of 
violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often 
motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the 
pursuit of goals that are usually political.‖37 Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter 
define terrorism as, ―The use of violence against civilians by non-state actors to 
attain political goals.‖38 Hizbullah claims it is not a terrorist organization, but 
rather a resistance force within Lebanon. The United States and some, not all, of 
its allies claim Hizbullah to be a terrorist organization. Terrorists and terrorist 
organizations, by design, are normally weaker—politically, financially and 
militarily—than their opponent. To achieve their goals, the terrorists use different 
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strategies. In the end, terror, acts of violence and intimidation all play a crucial 
role in attaining their goals. In response to this, the United States must 
understand the root causes of the problem and develop ways to combat and 
eliminate the threat.  
Hizbullah, though weaker than Israel, did well in the 2006 war and is 
arguably stronger than the Lebanese government in certain areas. Hizbullah 
enjoys a strong base of support through its robust social services section and the 
security it provides along the border with Israel. Hizbullah is also active in the 
Lebanese political system and has been for decades. Hizbullah‘s stated 
objectives include the establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Lebanon, the 
destruction of Israel and the elimination of Western influences from the Middle 
East.39 In 1992, Hizbullah sent a clear message it had changed its radical course 
and was abiding by the time-honored rules of the Lebanese electoral game. They 
campaigned with and against Amal depending upon the restrictions placed on 
them by Beirut and Damascus. Hizbullah knows it needs to maintain its base of 
radical supporters, but it must also be practical and garner the support of the 
political elites currently in power. It is stated that Hizbullah‘s internal coercion 
ended with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, but the ideals of the jihad are still 
strong within the organization. Hizbullah‘s objectives will be accomplished 
through a political and military strategy as time moves forward.40 The Lebanese 
population continues to elect members of Hizbullah to political positions 
solidifying its legitimate resistance role and degrading its terrorist label. Hizbullah 
continues to win the majority of the party bloc seats in legislative chamber and 
presses forward with their political jihad.41  
The pressing argument is whether Hizbullah should be classified as a 
terrorist organization or a resistance organization. As previously mentioned, 
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Hizbullah and its allies claim it is a resistance force, determined to wage a jihad 
against Israel and the United States. According to Hizbullah, when Israel is 
evicted from Lebanon, the population can choose what form of government it 
wants.  
The United States and Israel have a different view on the situation. 
Though the U.S. has not provided any proof of the attacks, they claim Hizbullah, 
backed by Iran, conducted the bombings and kidnappings in the 1980s. The 
United States often references Imad Mugniyeh and his role as a master terrorist 
for Hizbullah. The United States claim he was involved in everything from 
smuggling to the kidnappings and TWA hijackings.42 Israel also placed pressure 
on the United States to add Hizbullah to the presidential directive after 9–11. 
Israel was fighting the Palestinian Intifada and did not want to fight on a second 
front. By labeling Hizbullah a terrorist organization and placing it in the directive, 
Lebanon could be persuaded to dismantle it and freeze its monetary support and 
assets. Lebanon decided to use international laws and loopholes to circumvent 
the demands of the United States and maintain its support for Hizbullah.43  
Language and wording are vital. David C. Rapoport wrote about language 
in his second wave of modern terrorism, ―Second-wave organizations understood 
that they needed a new language to describe themselves because the term 
terrorist has accumulated so may negative connotations that those who identified 
themselves as terrorists incurred enormous political liabilities.‖44 Hizbullah 
needed to shun the label of terrorist organization and embrace the label of 
resistance force. Fighting its jihad against Israel and safeguarding the population 
as best as it could assist in defending its preferred label in the global arena.  
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F. HIZBULLAH’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Currently, Hizbullah is playing a vital role in Lebanon and the Middle East. 
Hizbullah is active, politically connected with Syria and Iran and has a strong 
financial backing from Iran. Hizbullah will continue to defend the southern border, 
protecting the population and attacking Israel when necessary. As long as 
Hizbullah maintains the support of the local population, Shi‘a and others, to 
include some Christians, it has the ability to remain relevant. In order to remove 
Hizbullah‘s relevancy from the area the Lebanese government must take control 
of the security and social services situation. The government deployed forces to 
southern Lebanon in the past however; results were more favorable with the 
Hizbullah fighters. Hizbullah does not have the level of bureaucracy and 
resistance the government has when dealing with deployments, allocation of 
money and services. It is for these reasons Hizbullah is able to provide for the 
population faster and more efficiently than the government. The leaders of 
parliament also know this and are not willing to upset the status quo within the 
area.  
The next chapter focuses on several topics, ultimately providing a 
framework for an indirect approach to countering Hizbullah. Asymmetric conflict, 
how large and small nations and organizations win and lose wars and the U.S. 




III. COUNTERING HIZBULLAH 
The previous chapter discussed Hizbullah from its creation until the 
present, focusing on the political, military and social aspects of the organization. 
This chapter will focus on asymmetric conflict and the need for Lebanon and its 
allies to take an indirect approach against Hizbullah in order to counter it and 
eventually render the militant wing irrelevant within the region.  
A. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
JP 1–02 defines asymmetric as the application of dissimilar strategies, 
tactics, capabilities and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent‘s 
strengths while exploiting its capabilities.45  
Andrew Mack in, ―Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 
Asymmetric Conflict,‖ observes conventional military superiority does not 
necessarily prevail in modern warfare. It is also important to note that according 
to Mack, the large conventional armies did not win militarily, but they did not lose 
militarily.46 Success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory, but from 
a progressive attrition of their opponents‘ political capability to wage war. FID, 
when closely coupled with a strong IDAD program, will provide the capabilities to 
a host nation to combat the organizations threatening the sovereignty of the 
state.  
Mack provides three reasons why the United States lost in the Vietnam 
War. These reasons are not solely associated with Vietnam. The reasons can be 
used for any conflict where there are stronger and weaker combatants. First, 
superiority in military power (conventionally defined) does not always guarantee 
victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be counterproductive. Second, the 
Vietnam War demonstrated how under certain conditions the theater of war 
extends beyond the battlefield to encompass the policy and social institutions of 
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the external power. This includes destroying the political capability or political will 
of the external power. This, according to Mack, is the most important factor with 
which the insurgents must be concerned. Third, Mack references Mao‘s 
protracted warfare ideals including the external power‘s willingness to absorb 
costs—both blood and treasure—and the notion that the guerrilla wins if he does 
not lose.47  
Mack notes rather strongly and repeatedly, if the will and political 
capability of the people supporting the external power are destroyed, then it does 
not matter how strong the military is; it becomes irrelevant.48 Mack lays out some 
of the factors necessary for the insurgents to avoid defeat, including retaining a 
minimum degree of vulnerability; imposing a steady accumulation of costs on the 
opponent; provoking the external power into escalating its efforts on the ground 
ultimately decreasing the political capability and will of the population; and 
imposing direct costs to the external power—troops killed and treasure 
expended. The direct costs become of strategic importance when they are 
translated into psychological and political indirect costs. Applied to this thesis, it 
is reasonable to hypothesize that the utility of FID can be enhanced by 
systemically incorporating political and psychological aspects of asymmetric 
conflict.  
Similarly, Ivan Arreguín-Toft discusses his theories of asymmetric conflict 
in his article, ―How the Weak Win Wars,‖ specifically the best predictor of 
asymmetric conflict outcomes is selecting the appropriate strategic interaction.49 
The author outlines the following ideal strategies—strong actors and their attack 
strategy of direct attack and barbarism and weak actors and their defensive 
strategy of direct defense and guerrilla warfare strategy.50 Arreguín-Toft builds 
upon Mao arguing, ―potential strategies and counterstrategies can be reduced to 
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distinct, ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect.‖ Direct approaches 
target an adversary‘s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary‘s capacity 
to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary‘s will to fight.51  
Arreguín-Toft discusses four hypotheses related to strategic interaction 
and conflict outcomes. 52 
1. Direct attack versus direct defense—―when strong actors attack 
using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct 
strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win 
quickly and decisively.‖  
2. Direct attack versus indirect defense—―when strong actors attack 
with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect 
strategy, all things being equal, weak actors should win.‖ 
3. Indirect attack versus direct defense—―when strong actors attack 
using an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct 
strategy, all things being equal, strong actors should lose.‖  
4. Indirect attack versus indirect defense—―when strong actors 
employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a guerrilla 
warfare strategy, all things being equal, strong actors should win.‖  
Arreguín-Toft concludes his article with, ―strong actors lose asymmetric 
conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries.‖ 
Based on the four hypotheses above, if strong actors implement same approach 
interactions they should win while opposite approach interactions favor weaker 
actors.53 The overall implication of strategic interaction is highly pertinent to FID 
as it can highlight the necessity for matching strategies in order for government 
forces to counter insurgents.  
Patricia Sullivan discussed reasons why strong states win or lose against 
small states or non-state actors. She argues strong state lose to small states 
because of a lack of political will or resolve, domestic policy constraints such as 
inappropriate strategies or an inappropriate use of force.54  
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Sullivan hypothesized strong states lose small wars when they 
underestimate the cost of attaining their war aims and initiate conflicts they 
cannot sustain. She said when two randomly paired states are engaged, the 
stronger state will win because of the placement of military capabilities at the 
forefront of conflict. Conversely, when states evaluate each other based on 
national interests—diplomacy, information, military and economics (DIME)—prior 
to conflict the outcome could favor either the strong or weak state based on the 
dismissal or exploitation of those national interests.55 According to Dr. Sullivan, 
there are three paths to victory:  
1. Render the opponent physically incapable of maintaining an 
organized offense or defense (military victory).  
2. Convince the opponent it will eventually be rendered incapable of 
fighting. 
3. Convince the opponent the cost of victory will be greater than the 
price it is willing to pay, (this is how weak states win).56 
The strong state wages war based on the destructive capacity of their 
military while weak states choose to wage war based on their cost tolerance. The 
destructive capacity of a military relates to the physical effects an actor can 
produce given the available resources. Cost tolerance is the extent of human and 
material costs an actor is willing to absorb. Strong states choose war when the 
destructive capacity advantage will allow them to destroy their opponent‘s 
capacity and/or will to fight at an acceptable cost. Weak states choose war when 
they are willing to absorb any cost their opponent can impose, or impose enough 
damage, politically and militarily, to convince their opponent the cost of war is a 
greater price than it is willing to pay.57   
When dealing with the typology of political objectives (Figure 1), war can 
range from brute force to coercive. Traditionally, wars were fought over power 
and resources, regime change and the defense and seizure of territory, but these 
                                            




are becoming less frequent. Wars are coercive in nature and fought for political, 
military, religious and cultural reasons, in addition to intangible reasons such as 
policy change and compliance.58 War is more likely to be fought when the cost is 
underestimated opposed to overestimated. If the cost of war could be identified 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities, fewer wars would be fought. The increase in 
tolerance for the war by the weaker states increases as the time and cost of the 
war increases. Tolerance decreases for the strong states. Public favor, in the 
strong states, for the war reduces as the length of the conflict continues. 
Additionally, conflicts resolved prior to hostilities favor the strong (threats may be 
made, overwhelming military capacity, etc.). Conflicts resolved after the initiation 
of hostilities favor the strong when land and governance are the ultimate aims 
and favor the weak when policy change is the ultimate aim. Underestimating the 
cost of war by the strong leads to an increased chance of success for the weak.59 
                                            




Figure 1.  Typology of Political Objectives60 
B. ADOPTION OF AN INDIRECT STRATEGY 
In order for Lebanon and specifically the LAF to counter Hizbullah‘s 
efforts, Lebanon must adopt an indirect strategy against Hizbullah. Lebanon must 
make the benefits of disbanding Hizbullah‘s militant wing outweigh the costs of 
maintaining the wing. The government and the LAF need to focus their efforts on 
developing and implementing a military, political and social services strategy 
attacking Hizbullah through indirect efforts. Hizbullah is deeply imbedded in the 
political framework of the Lebanese government and it gains more support during 
every election. Hizbullah realized the organization is more effective when a 
political strategy is employed against the Lebanese government. The social 
services section is effective and responsive in times of need for the Lebanese 
population, especially the Shi‘a Muslims. The weakest link to the organization 
and the one where the greatest strides could be made is the military wing.  
 
                                            
60 Sullivan, ―Who Wins?‖ 
 29 
Hizbullah is not going to attempt to undertake direct action against the LAF; they 
do not possess the necessary assets and this is counterproductive to achieving 
their political and jihadist aims.  
The following section explains some of the areas of concern with direct 
and indirect action undertaken by the LAF, Hizbullah and U.S. FID efforts. A 
direct action is one the Lebanese government, LAF, or U.S. FID efforts would 
undertake expressly against Hizbullah. An indirect action is one the Lebanese 
government, LAF, or U.S. FID efforts could undertake against Hizbullah using the 
population, allies or international community.  
1. Lebanese Armed Forces’ Direct Approach 
Lebanon must provide better social services and infrastructure to the Shi‘a 
minority in southern Lebanon. The LAF needs to work in synchronization with the 
economic efforts of the government in order to provide for a better standard of 
living. If the government can provide these services and take away the base of 
support for Hizbullah, there is an increased chance Hizbullah will lose legitimacy 
and relevancy.  
The LAF must provide increased military security in the southern border 
areas with Israel. Hizbullah is currently providing this security. The LAF must 
reduce the popular support Hizbullah receives from the population based on the 
security it provides. Israel has stated publically it would remove its forces from 
the security zone if the LAF assumes the security role from Hizbullah. 
Additionally, the Lebanese government must overcome its own political system‘s 
shortcomings to deal with these internal security threats.61 
2. Lebanese Armed Forces’ Indirect Approach 
The U.S. FID program needs to address national issues and work closely 
with the host-nation‘s IDAD strategy. The strategy needs to anticipate, preclude 
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and counter threats and address the root cause of instability.62 These programs 
need to include the efforts and resources of local and foreign militaries, non-
governmental organizations and law enforcement agencies. The IDAD approach 
revolves around undermining the adversary‘s political strength first, and its 
military might second. Gaining popular support is vital for the successful 
implementation and completion of the strategy.63 
Vital to this indirect approach is the development of psychological 
operations (PSYOPs) and public affairs departments to get the country‘s 
message out to the local population—Hizbullah is a terrorist organization, the 
militant wing is detrimental to the safety and security of the country and the 
government is going to assist in the rebuilding and management of the country.  
Increasing the amount of non-lethal aid, such as money, materiel, 
humanitarian efforts, liaisons, technological experts, etc., to the military, 
government and population will improve the effectiveness of all aspects of the 
military and governance apparatus within Lebanon. Additional levels of increased 
security assistance—multinational education, multinational training, 
counternarcotics assistance, defense and military contracts, defense support to 
public diplomacy, facilities and infrastructure projects will also have a profound 
advantage on the effectiveness of the Lebanese government.64 
3. Hizbullah Direct Approach 
Hizbullah is a prominent fixture within Lebanese society and the Levant. 
Its paramilitary wing is strong and effective and it could attack the LAF directly. 
However, this is not a plausible or feasible option for Hizbullah. It is counter-
productive to their agenda. Iran and Syria could offer more money and material 
and even openly assist Hizbullah in attacking the LAF. This is also not likely to 
occur. Lebanon is an ally of the United States and other Western countries. It is 
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not in the best national interests of Iran or Syria to engage in a military conflict 
with the United States and its allies due to the high cost of blood and treasure 
which would be expended. 
Hizbullah‘s direct approach against the LAF and Lebanese government 
would be intimately linked to Syria and Iran. Lebanon used to be included in the 
territory controlled by Syria. Because of this, Syria still has a vested interest in 
Lebanon‘s national and international activities. If the al-Asad regime should fall, 
Hizbullah would lose a powerful ally in the region as well as a significant portion 
of its financial support. Iran also has a vested interest in the Syrian regime not 
failing. Iran‘s revolution was exported in 1980s and was instrumental in the 
creation of Hizbullah. Iran would have a much more difficult time in supporting 
Hizbullah if they become cut off from Syria. 
4. Hizbullah Indirect Approach 
Hizbullah has been operating indirectly since its creation over 30 years 
ago. One of the crucial factors in Hizbullah‘s continued success is its excellent 
social services branch. The Shi‘a minority areas in southern Lebanon were 
mismanaged, financially underdeveloped and lacking in suitable infrastructure 
during and after the Lebanese civil war. The social services provided by 
Hizbullah in the early 1980s were critical in cementing its authority and legitimacy 
in the region.  
Hizbullah continues to receive monetary and military support from Syria 
and Iran. This money is one of the primary sources of income for the organization 
and is used to fund all areas of operation including the social services branch. 
5. U.S. FID Efforts Direct Approach 
Host nation commanders, including LAF commanders, are concerned with 
the number of men that can be trained and the training resources U.S. forces 
provide. Because of this, local forces are usually trained in marksmanship, close  
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quarters battle, communication between elements, long-range target interdiction, 
medical support and evacuation, leadership training, operations planning and 
orders production. 
FID is core task of the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), but can be accomplished by conventional forces. U.S. forces 
generally develop lethal training packages to instruct foreign forces. These 
training approaches are excellent for conventional armies to wage war against 
each other. This training approach is not suited to training foreign armies to 
defeat non-traditional, non-state, or terrorist adversaries. 
6. U.S. FID Efforts Indirect Approach 
The most important focus for an indirect approach is the population. 
Hizbullah has a robust social services section. FID and IDAD efforts need to 
address these issues. Lebanon needs to provide more DIME support to vital 
areas such as schools, roads, access to clean water, better economic 
advancement, louder voice in the local leadership and greater input in national 
politics. The U.S. should provide initial funding and economic development and 
aid packages. These finite aid packages can be used to initiate Lebanese efforts 
for stability and security. 
The four IDAD functions—balanced development, security, neutralization 
and mobilization are essential in developing a complete indirect strategy. Each of 
these will be expanded upon in a following section. Additionally, the integration of 
multiple lines of effort from several different agencies, vertical between the levels 
of command and horizontal between United States government agencies, HN 
military and civilian organizations will complete the indirect strategy. The ultimate 
goal of an indirect FID and IDAD strategy is to build a viable political, economic, 
military and social institution necessary to respond to the needs of the society.65 
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C. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
The IDAD program is the government‘s basis for security assistance, FID 
and any other actions undertaken by the U.S. government on behalf of a HN. The 
IDAD program coupled with a strong FID program conducted by competent and 
prepared military elements and agencies will provide the necessary combination 
of military and non-military efforts to combat an insurgent or criminal element. 
The IDAD program uses four interdependent functions to prevent or counter 
internal threats. These functions are depicted in Figure 2. JP 3–22 states 
balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, 
economic and social programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society 
to share in the rewards of development. Correcting conditions that make a 
society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem. Security includes all 
activities implemented to protect the populace from violence and to provide a 
safe environment for natural development. Neutralization is a political concept 
that makes an insurgent irrelevant to the political process, is the physical and 
psychological separation of the threatening elements from the populace, can 
involve arrest and prosecution and can involve combat action when the 
adversaries‘ violent actions escalate. All neutralization efforts must be legal. This 
is essential for humanitarian reasons and to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
government. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources 
and it includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support for the 
government.66  
Since every situation is unique, the four functional areas are combined 
with specific principles to guide the efforts necessary to defeat an internal threat. 
These principles include: unity of effort, intelligence, civil military operations 
(CMO), PSYOPs, a minimum use of force, a responsive government and  
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strategic communication.67 The principles are depicted in Figure 2. Lebanon and 
its allies should use these principles, coupled with the IDAD functions, to form a 
comprehensive indirect strategy to counter Hizbullah.  
The functional areas and principles are outlined below with specific ideas 
towards Lebanon and Hizbullah. 
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Figure 2.  Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model (JP 3–22)68 
1. IDAD Functions and an Indirect Approach 
In order for a nation to be successful in implementing the balanced 
development function, it must incorporate the population into essential areas of 
political, economic and social decision making. The government needs to elicit 
                                            
68 Headquarters, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–22, II–2. 
 36 
ideas and recommendations from scholars, persons with technological 
backgrounds, scientists and economists for ways to increase productivity, quality-
of-life infrastructure and reduce fraud, waste and abuse of resources. The 
conditions contributing to the internal threat of Lebanon need to be identified and 
neutralized. The conditions making the society vulnerable need to be corrected 
so the society can advance as a whole.69 
Essential to the security function is the protection of the population and the 
state‘s ability to provide a safe and secure environment for national 
development.70 Lebanon and the LAF need to increase the physical security 
within the government and military. While increasing these efforts, the 
government must also undermine the security efforts of Hizbullah throughout 
southern Lebanon and especially in the security zone separating Lebanon and 
Israel. The government and the LAF need to prove to the population and 
especially the Shi‘a Muslims, that safety is the utmost concern and priority. The 
transition to LAF security in the region is critical. Any lapse in security could lead 
to border altercations between Lebanon and Israel.  
In order for the neutralization function to be effective, the Lebanese 
government needs to render the military wing of Hizbullah irrelevant through 
increased training and employment of the LAF. The government must prove to 
the population, through the use of PSYOPs, diplomatic alliances with the U.S. 
and other key allies within the Levant and Middle East and strategic messaging, 
Hizbullah is irrelevant within Lebanon. The organization is nothing more than a 
criminal enterprise that does not have the best interests of the state in its sights.  
Mobilization is the most time sensitive of the IDAD functions. Lebanon 
must provide materiel to the population, or develop means and systems to 
acquire the necessary logistics to combat Hizbullah. Weapons and war stocks 
are important, but engineer and humanitarian assets are also vital to minimize 
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the efforts and necessity of Hizbullah. The government, in order to be effective 
needs to provide a faster and more complete government response to conflict, 
natural disaster and national growth than Hizbullah does in southern Lebanon 
and for the minority Shi‘a population. 
2. IDAD Principles and an Indirect Approach 
The unity of effort principle is difficult in Lebanon. Lebanon has a 
confessionalism-based government. While there are three major religious 
groups—Maronite Christians and Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims vying for power in 
Lebanon—Lebanese law recognizes 18 distinct confessional groups, each with 
corporate group rights. The religious, political, military and business leaders must 
come to an accord with regards to the national development of the country. What 
is in the best interest of individuals may not be in the best interest of the 
community. The unity of effort is essential in developing Lebanon, denying 
Hizbullah its support from Syria and Iran and ultimately rendering Hizbullah 
ineffective.  
All levels of governance and defense require the maximum use of 
intelligence. This intelligence ensures the government stays abreast of 
Hizbullah‘s efforts. The intelligence allows the government to make timely and 
accurate decisions for the population and the state. The intelligence ensures the 
government is prepared to respond to a crisis and deploy the appropriate assets 
to any areas troubled by disaster, war, or other hardship.  
CMO and PSYOPs are critical in undermining Hizbullah‘s social services 
section and providing an increased legitimacy for and dependence upon, the 
Lebanese government. CMO must be increased to provide the basic social 
services needed by the local population. Access to fresh water, jobs, education 
and medical facilities are essential in swaying the popular support from Hizbullah 
towards the government. CMO must be carefully thought out, because Hizbullah 
has an advantage with its social services division. Specifically, it can be argued 
that social services and charity are a binding act within the Zakat pillar of Islam 
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and CMO are mandated by national interests; Hizbullah operates with complete 
freedom because they are part of a legitimate government, but also part of a 
quasi-terrorist organization and most importantly Hizbullah‘s social service 
section is already integrated into Lebanese society. PSYOPs should be 
employed to discredit the actions of Hizbullah‘s social service section in southern 
Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. PSYOPs can be used effectively in showcasing 
the advancements of the Lebanese government and LAF along with the national 
development projects undertaken with its allies. Additionally, an effective 
PSYOPs campaign can be used to discredit the efforts of foreign nations such as 
Syria and Iran. 
A minimum use of force in certain circumstances produces a far greater 
effect than a large conventional military or law enforcement response. The 
security zone in southern Lebanon is a hotly-contested region and has been for 
more than thirty years. The LAF need to develop force packages that employ the 
maximum amount of PSYOPs, CMO, medical and engineer personnel and limit 
the number of combat troops. Limiting the combat personnel to only those 
needed to safely secure the border will reduce tensions between Lebanon and 
Israel, ultimately discrediting the large militant wing Hizbullah maintains in the 
region for that purpose.  
A responsive government is vital for the stability and development of a 
state. The Lebanese government needs to increase its responsiveness and 
efficiency towards its population. In order to discredit and reduce the actions of 
Hizbullah the Lebanese government needs to become more decisive and reduce 
the bureaucratic hindrances plaguing it. The government must listen to the 
population and provide for their needs.  
The Lebanese government and LAF need to develop a strategic 
communication plan and ensure it is delivered throughout the country. Hizbullah 
runs its own television station, al-Manar television and it is effective in 
broadcasting its message to the Shi‘a population especially in southern Lebanon. 
The Lebanese government must discredit Hizbullah‘s message and implement its 
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own national message complete with themes, reconstruction updates, national 
development strategies, partnerships with global commerce, diplomacy, etc. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Implementing an indirect approach is likely the only way that Lebanon can 
succeed in discrediting and eventually taming Hizbullah so its militant wing can 
be rendered ineffective and disarmed. The United States can greatly assist the 
Lebanese government and LAF through the development and implementation of 
a comprehensive IDAD and FID strategy. The policy needs to center around the 
population, especially the Shi‘a Muslim population in southern Lebanon. The 
policy also needs to focus on unity of effort, separating the Lebanese 
government from governments that support Hizbullah and providing the 
Lebanese with the global resources necessary to advance national objectives. 
The initial goal is to discredit Hizbullah and render them ineffective throughout 
Lebanon and the region. Additionally, the base of support for Hizbullah needs to 
be controlled by the national government. Their basic and advanced needs 
should be the primary short-term goal of the government. If Hizbullah loses its 
base of support then the government can continue its indirect strategy of 
dismantling and defeating the organization.  
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IV. INDIRECT APPROACH CASE STUDIES 
This chapter examines two case studies where an indirect approach was 
used to combat an adversary. The first case study examines the indirect 
approaches the British government used in its efforts to bring peace to Northern 
Ireland and defeat the IRA. The second case study examines the United States 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and VSO in Afghanistan. Both case studies 
provide background information on the indirect approaches used to combat the 
threats posed by the IRA in Northern Ireland and Taliban in Afghanistan.  
A. BRITAIN AND IRELAND 
1. Background Information 
The island of Ireland was ruled by neighboring Britain for many hundreds 
of years. English settlers were planted on the island in an attempt to pacify the 
Irish. Many of these settlers, wealthy Protestants, received large plots of land and 
subjugated the local Catholic population.71 According to Thomas H. Henrikesn, 
―The use of settlers to stabilize unruly regions is a time-polished practice seen in 
lands around the world.‖72 Louise Richardson says, ―The Act of Union of 1800 
united Britain and Ireland in the United Kingdom, but many Irish people resisted 
the union both peacefully and violently throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century.‖73 After World War I, the British government passed the Government of 
Ireland Act of 1922, establishing two states in Ireland.74 The South eventually 
severed ties with Britain and declared independence in 1947.75 The struggle for 
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sovereignty pursued two paths—one through the parliament and constitution, the 
other through underground revolution—ultimately leading Ireland into a bloody 
decades long conflict.76 
In the 1960s a Catholic middle class emerged in Ireland. Inspired by the 
U.S. Civil Rights movement, they tried to effect change within the governmental 
apparatus.77 The Protestants saw the civil rights movement as an attack on the 
state and moved to defend itself.78 The Lord Cameron committee investigated 
and reported on the causes of the civil disturbances in the 1960s, finding a rising 
sense of injustice and grievance among the minority Catholics in public housing 
allocation, local government appointments and manipulation of local elections 
against them.79 Henriksen writes, ―It is impossible to escape the conclusions 
drawn from many reports and commissions that widespread discrimination 
existed in Northern Ireland.‖80 In 1969, the British government deployed troops to 
Northern Ireland in defense of civil power to restore order.81 In 1972 the British 
government dissolved the Stormont Parliament due to inefficiency and its inability 
to reform itself and Britain ruled Northern Ireland directly from Westminster until 
1998.82  
2. Growth of the Irish Republican Army 
The deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland did not stem the 
violence and civil unrest. The troops were required to assist the local authorities 
with enforcing the laws, laws which the Catholics viewed as Protestant in 
nature.83 Due to this, the arrival of the British troops enormously assisted the 
                                            
76 Henriksen, What Really Happened, 12. 
77 Richardson, ―Britain and the IRA,‖ 66. 
78 Ibid., 66. 
79 Henriksen, What Really Happened, 18. 
80 Ibid., 19. 
81 Richardson, ―Britain and the IRA,‖ 66. 
82 Ibid., 66. 
83 Ibid., 68. 
 43 
growth of the IRA.84 Additionally, due to the atrocities of the police, (the notorious 
B Specials85) and in response to the marauding mobs, Catholics barricaded 
themselves into ―no-go‖ areas to keep the security forces out, allowing the IRA to 
organize openly.86 The IRA continued to openly grow and become more defiant 
based on other heavy-handed approaches taken by the British troops and local 
police authorities. Some of these approaches included: imposing curfews, 
weapons searches exclusively in Catholic neighborhoods, ransacking homes, 
humiliating automobile occupants during searches and harassment of 
pedestrians on the streets.87 The Commission of Human Rights ruled on January 
18, 1978 that five interrogation techniques were used on members of the IRA.88 
The commission found the techniques were a practice of inhumane and 
degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention of Human Rights, but did 
not constitute a practice of torture within the meaning of the Article.89 Richardson 
writes, ―These techniques might not be too bad for a hardened military activist, 
but to the regular civilians on whom they were most often used, they were 
terrifying.‖90 The last vestige of credibility was removed from the British when the 
Widgery Tribunal exonerated the soldiers involved in the Bloody Sunday 
massacre on January 30, 1972, where 13 Catholics were killed by British 
soldiers.91 The popularity of the IRA was not consistent. The pattern fluctuated 
throughout the conflict with membership rising after a British atrocity and falling 
after an IRA atrocity.92  
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3. British Approach to Defeating the Insurgency in Northern 
Ireland 
Following the events of Bloody Sunday, the British needed to re-evaluate 
their counterinsurgency strategy against the IRA. The British completely changed 
their strategy from a heavy-handed approach to a softer one, touting a stability-
by-civility approach.93 Henriksen quotes the noted military author Martin van 
Creveld saying, ―The real secret behind the British success: extreme self-
control.‖94 Henriksen also said, ―Britain‘s non-military response to the paramilitary 
violence played the major role in the eventual pacification.‖95 Richardson writes, 
―While British policy on the surface often appears reactive and inconsistent, both 
Labour and Conservative governments have consistently adhered to a set of 
basic principles. The first and most important goal has been to restore order; the 
second, to ensure conditions that enable that order to be maintained.‖96 
The British focused on four areas for their indirect strategy against the IRA 
in an attempt to reign in the violence and restore order and governance to 
Northern Ireland. The British focused on local government, jobs, housing and 
community relations and education.97 Britain suspended the Stormont Parliament 
and directly ruled Northern Ireland.98 With London running the local government 
directly, the political process and resources reached the minority Christians, 
social services and social-services entitlements increased, healthcare and 
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increased revenue and services distributed from London.99 Additionally, 
imprisoned IRA members were elected to seats in Parliament increasing the 
benefits and political ends for the Catholics.100  
According to Henriksen, ―It was the discriminatory allocation of housing by 
local authorities that spurred the civil rights protests in the late 1960s.‖101 The 
British government established a centralized housing authority, the Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE).102 The NIHE ―embodied the mission of 
eliminating the grounds for complaints in order to reduce the bias of underlying 
disaffection ‗beyond violence and ensure future viability and well-being‘.‖103 NIHE 
became the United Kingdom‘s first comprehensive housing authority and had a 
substantial impact in Northern Ireland increasing the availability of housing for 
Catholics and Protestants alike.104  
Britain established the Fair Employment Act in 1976 in an effort to combat 
unemployment, which hovered around 14 percent.105 The Fair Employment Act 
imposed no formal quotas, but it did strengthen hiring practices throughout the 
country eventually increasing Christian employment to pre-Troubles period 
numbers.106 The implementation of fairer employment opportunities increased 
the revenue and economic base for the entire country and not just the Christian 
population. The creation of jobs put people to work and lessened inter-sectarian 
violence.107 
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The British government also implemented drastic reform in the areas of 
community relations and education. The goal in increasing community relations 
was to bring the local religious populations together, foster tolerance and cultural 
pluralism and establish contacts between them.108 In 1990, the Northern Ireland 
Community Relations Council was established within the office of the Secretary 
of Northern Ireland, to nurture equal opportunity and assist in the passage of 
educational reforms.109 Some of these educational reforms included the 
establishment of religiously integrated schools, ensuring teachers understand 
their responsibility to help children understand and respect each other and 
provide access to higher education.110 
The British government increased their public relations campaign within 
Northern Ireland proving Protestants and Catholics are benefiting from the 
increased peace and attention placed on the four critical areas identified in the 
soft approach against terrorism. The economic base increased. The availability of 
housing increased. Advances in healthcare increased. These increases were 
beneficial in reducing the violence and bringing the IRA to a complete 
disarmament after the attacks of 9–11 (along with the new political climate within 
the U.S. government and its stance on terrorism).111 
Additional indirect approaches the British government used to combat the 
terrorist adversary operating in Northern Ireland included demilitarizing the local 
security forces. The local security forces were mostly Protestant and never 
gained the trust of the Catholics.112 In addition to demilitarizing the security 
forces, the British government moved forward with their political public relations 
campaigns to de-politicize and criminalize the terrorists.113 
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Richardson claims, ―The most important weapon in any campaign against 
terrorism is intelligence.‖114 The British used interrogation techniques in their 
attempt to quell the violence. In addition to the questioning, many Catholics were 
imprisoned without trial. There was a belief that convictions could not be won in 
trials, so the government moved to internment without trial.115 Outrage increased 
as initially only Catholics were imprisoned and became even stronger when it 
was determined that those interned had nothing to do with the IRA.116 According 
to Henriksen, the policy of internment without trial was ―narrowly effective, but 
widely controversial,‖ with the immediate gains it generated backfiring on the 
officials.117 
Another example of an indirect approach included opening dialogue with 
the terrorists. Most countries adopt a policy of no negotiation with terrorists.118 
Reasons for this include demonstrating that terrorism will not be rewarded, 
demonstrating repugnance for the terrorists and insisting on maintaining a moral 
distance between the government and terrorists.119 The official policy of the 
British government included no negotiations, but in reality, talks were ongoing 
throughout the conflict.120 The negotiations and associated cease-fires were 
used to gather intelligence on both sides and determine what grievances could 
be addressed to eliminate violence and move the countries forward 
economically, politically and socially.  
Critical to the British success in Northern Ireland were the reduction of 
heavy-handed military approaches to the violence, increased communication 
between both parties towards an agreed upon peace settlement, and economic 
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and social advances in jobs, housing and education. All of these factors were 
intertwined and vital for the success of the British. The initial military and security 
approach were violent and created more IRA and enemies of the state than it 
eliminated. Henriksen writes, ―By addressing the roots of Catholic discontent and 
discrimination, British governments siphoned off enough anger, enticed enough 
collaborators and neutralized enough opposition that it undermined much of the 
minority‘s support for IRA violence and led to a peaceful political resolution.‖121  
B. AFGHANISTAN AND VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS 
1. Background Information 
In his paper ―The Rise of Afghanistan‘s Insurgency,‖ Seth Jones discusses 
in his introduction the fall of the Taliban and the rise of its insurgency. He states 
in 2001 a force of approximately 100 Central Intelligence Agency officers, 350 
USSF soldiers and 15,000 Afghans overthrew the Taliban regime in less than 
three months.122 The initial success transitions into a full insurgency in 2006 as 
the Taliban attempted to overthrow the Afghan government.123 Jones writes, 
―Scholars have argued that insurgencies usually begin because of grievances 
among ethnic groups or greed.‖124 Jones argues the pre-condition for the onset 
of the insurgency was structural—the collapse of the governance after the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime.125 He continues saying the insurgency took 
advantage of the government being unable to provide basic services and goods, 
its weak security forces and the gap unfilled by international forces.126  
Scott Mann conducted a video interview on October 3, 2012 and 
discussed the Special Operations Forces (SOF) lessons learned from the 
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Afghanistan VSO program. In his opening remarks, Mann said the emphasis 
from 2003-2009 was on targeting Taliban leadership and forces, conducting 
small-scale ―old school‖ SOF operations in villages and bringing governance, 
economic development and security to the country from the highest levels of 
government to the rural populations (a top-down, macro approach).127 Mann 
iterates Seth Jones‘ assessment the top-down approach is ill-suited for 
Afghanistan and never worked in the history of Afghanistan except for the reign 
of the Iron Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan from 1880–1901.128 
Mann gave a verbal history of Afghanistan in his interview, with discussion 
on the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, the Musahiban Dynasty (1929–1978) 
and the current insurgency stemming from predominantly rural Pashtun areas. 
He stated the ethnic Pashtuns comprise the majority of the rural populations and 
the bulk of the insurgency. These rural Pashtuns had been displaced and killed 
by the millions during the Soviet occupation and the continued conflicts within the 
current war. Because of this, the tribal elders who formed the Jirga (a tribal 
council) are unable to conduct their traditional roles of feudal lords, judges and 
educators.  
Mann discussed the Musahiban Dynasty. He said this was a period of 
security and prosperity for Afghanistan. He claims the reason for this was the 
central government and the local Jirgas had an understanding between them. 
The central government would provide resources and state guidance to the 
whole country. The Jirgas agreed to this, but they were also able to govern 
themselves independently of the central government based on the traditional 
feudal systems and rural tribal codes. The rural populations settled feuds, 
distributed knowledge, supplies, resources and they protected themselves from 
threats both inside and outside their tribes. The Jirga had a standing body of  
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young men called the Arbakai. These men were sons of the elders, enforced the 
decisions of the elders in the Jirga and defended the villages as an ad-hoc militia 
against enemies.  
This agreement worked throughout the dynasty, but not after the Soviet 
invasion. The elders were either killed or displaced to other areas foreign to 
them. After the U.S. led overthrow of the Taliban, the villages and elders did not 
return to the same agreement with the central government. Kabul wanted to rule 
from the center and the U.S. led efforts encouraged this form of government and 
security. This did not work for the local villages. Services and support did not 
reach the villages. The Taliban saw the void, the lawlessness and the lack of 
elder leadership. The Taliban moved into the villages and took over implementing 
a Sharia (religious) based system of law which was opposite from the traditional 
norms. According to Dr. Irdis, ―elders will not return to power on their own. A third 
party is needed to bring them back to power. Security and governance are 
necessary for them to step back into power.‖129 
Throughout the mid and late 2000s the Taliban increased its stranglehold 
on the rural Afghan population and the central government was unable to stop its 
progress. The top-down, or formal approach to governance was not working the 
in the rural areas. Targeting of Taliban leadership and forces was not addressing 
the problems of security and stability. The VSO program was developed to 
address the issues of stability in the rural villages. 
2. The Village Stability Operations Program 
The VSO program underwent several evolutions prior to its current (and 
evolving) form. The program has three lines of effort—a bottom-up approach, a 
focus on security, economic development and governance and achieve an 
enduring balance of stability between top and bottom (central government in 
Kabul and rural villages).130  
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The VSO methodology is divided into four phases: shape, hold, build and 
transition.131 The shape phase is focused on gaining entry into the village with 
three measures of success: SOF are able to help defend the village, SOF are 
postured to oversee all their operations and the Afghan villagers view SOF as 
welcomed guests of their village.132 The hold phase is focused on stabilizing the 
village: security, economic development, expansion of the Afghan Local Police 
(ALP) and increasing governance with a return to the traditional Jirga.133 When 
the bottom up lines of operation of security, economic development and 
governance are reached in the hold phase then the village is stable.134 The focus 
of the build phase is to connect the recently stabilized village to the local Afghan 
government in the district.135 The last phase, the transition phase, occurs when 
the top down and bottom up approaches for the village and the central Afghan 
government meet and are stable. VSO transition must be effects-based and tied 
to the capacity of traditional village level institutions as well as the capacity of the 
village and central government to connect in an enduring fashion at the district 
and provincial levels.136 
The VSO program remembers the problems of the local systems that are 
degraded or destroyed. The root causes of instability are not tied to the 
government‘s inability to provide resources. The root causes at the local level are 
their current inability to provide resources and conflict resolution, areas 
historically vital to the stability and growth of the rural villages. The absence of 
these systems has been supplanted by the Islamists who use Sharia based law 
to rule.  
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3. Indirect Approach Lessons Learned from VSO 
Several lessons have been learned from using an indirect approach 
through VSO to combat the Taliban insurgency. First, the U.S. and its allies have 
tried the top-down formal approach for a decade with little success. The VSO 
program and its bottom-up approach have been more successful in bringing 
relative stability to the rural regions. Second, the pace of communications 
between the villages and the central government needs to be faster than the 
communications of the Taliban. Third, the VSO and FID methodology are a 
continuum of the full spectrum of conflict, rather than an episodic approach to 
victory, meaning VSO and FID are part of the solution and not solely the solution. 
Fourth, the insurgents need to be rendered illegitimate. It is easier to accomplish 
this than it would be to defeat or destroy them. If the credibility of the insurgents 
is removed from the population, they lose their base of support and then can be 
removed from the villages.137  
Additional lessons learned include taking more time to understand the 
area, people and cultures where we operate. Living and working side by side with 
the Afghan population is also crucial in maintaining legitimacy and credibility with 
them. Economic development in the country needs to come out of the vacuum 
that it is currently in. All elements of national power that are working in this area 
need to talk and share ideas, so the correct projects and developments are 
instituted. What is good for Kabul is not a one size fits all approach for the rural 
villages and their form of Jirga governance.138 The Afghan people need to stand 
up for themselves and not be intimidated by the Taliban. As the Taliban is 
reduced, intimidation from them could increase. It is vital the U.S. and its allies 
stand by the Afghan people during this time.139  
                                            
137 Mann, ―SOF Lessons Learned.‖ 
138 Ibid. 
139 Mann, ―VSO-101,‖ 28. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The use of extreme or heavy-handed measures is not always sufficient to 
defeat a small-scale or determined adversary. The British have learned this 
throughout the years, developing specialized units to conduct counterinsurgency 
operations throughout the world most notably in Northern Ireland and Malaya. 
British adaptability stemmed from the conditions its counterinsurgency forces 
faced. Limited resources and the need to fight smarter than their enemy was the 
key rather than reliance on massive amounts of firepower.140 The deployment of 
large-scale forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations may not be 
necessary. According to Richardson, ―A professional and well-trained military 
may be too much of a blunt instrument when deployed in a civilian context‖.141  
In Afghanistan, the large military footprint of the International Security 
Assistance Force is capable and adequate in some respects, but also 
undermines the Afghan government and ultimately U.S. efforts. The formal, 
whole of government approach, is not sufficient if there is no stability in the rural 
villages where the Taliban reside and thrive. The VSO program intricately and 
adequately addresses the root causes of the insurgency and the inability of the 
central government to provide for the return of the traditional government.  
Counterinsurgency forces and traditional armies need to adapt themselves 
to an ever-changing environment. If a heavy-handed approach is too blunt for the 
situation, a softer, indirect approach is required to neutralize the threat. Learning 
from past conflicts is an excellent way to garner ideas and present options for 
success.  
                                            
140 Henriksen, What Really Happened, 4. 
141 Richardson, ―Britain and the IRA,‖ 77. 
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The United States of America came into existence because it waged an 
insurgency against a country that was superior in military strength, economic 
development and governance. Britain, being far superior, won many battles 
fighting the colonists. However, their massive military might could not win against 
the indirect approaches undertaken by the American colonies, participating in the 
South.  
Sovereign nations need to address non-traditional threats and terrorist 
organizations through appropriate means. A massive military strike or heavy 
handed approach may be unacceptable in world opinion and ineffective against 
the threat. Lebanon is no different. A heavy-handed approach against Hizbullah 
is counterproductive. Understanding the current threat environment within 
Lebanon and the Levant area, as well as the global threat environment, will allow 
Lebanon and its allies to develop a comprehensive indirect approach against 
their terrorist adversary.  
Parallels can be drawn from the two case studies to inform Lebanese 
policy. The British did not defeat the IRA, but they were successful in disarming 
the organization. Lebanon can do the same with Hizbullah. The organization is 
deeply rooted in Lebanese society. Hizbullah‘s militant wing can be rendered 
ineffective by the government and disarmed. A grand political deal will have to be 
forged between the government and Hizbullah. Without a political deal it is 
doubtful that the Lebanese government will be successful. Disarming Hizbullah 
will take time and resources, but it can be accomplished by following similar 
strategies other nations have used successfully.  
In Afghanistan, the VSO program may be successful after the U.S. 
withdrawal if the ALPs are properly trained and equipped. The ALPs have to 
grow at a steady rate. Using the training and equipment they received from the 
international security force and especially USSF, the ALP will be able to maintain 
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security and stability within the rural villages. The coordination between the ALP 
and the local elders on the Shura will be crucial for the success of the VSO 
program after the U.S. withdrawal. The LAF can accomplish the same goals in 
Lebanon taking advantage of the assistance it receives from U.S. FID training 
and other international support. The LAF will have to maintain their security 
posture and continue to train new soldiers. The Lebanese government also 
needs to ask for international assistance and implement the proper strategies to 
combat Hizbullah. Close coordination between the LAF, local law enforcement 
and the government will ensure the proper resources and efforts are 
implemented to tame Hizbullah and provide for the population.  
Using history as a guide, Lebanon may see how it can counter Hizbullah 
and undermine its bases of support. Lebanon must delegitimize Hizbullah and its 
military actions. The same was done in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan. The 
terrorists or insurgents need to be portrayed as incompetent thugs. Their actions 
need to be identified as criminal and counterproductive to the advancement of 
Lebanese society.  
The government, supported by the military, needs to increase public 
spending and social services in the areas that need it most—poor, rural Shi‘a 
centers. These centers are where Hizbullah garners the majority of its public 
support. Money received by Hizbullah from Iran and other international support is 
used to advance a robust social services agenda within southern Lebanon and 
the Beqaa Valley. The Lebanese government must identify projects and areas of 
contention within the Shi‘a minority areas. If immediate attention is paid to these 
projects, Hizbullah could be seen as uncommitted to the population and lose 
some of its support base. Similar to Northern Ireland, if Lebanon increases the 
spending and social services within the Shi‘a areas it will have a positive effect 
on neighboring areas in terms of economic development and increased peace 
and stability.  
The LAF need to identify an acceptable mixture of military and civilian 
control to provide security along the southern border with Israel. Hizbullah has 
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been the de facto guard along the border for decades. This increases the 
tensions between Lebanon and Israel and has led to many armed conflicts and 
wars throughout the years. A full-scale military deployment to southern Lebanon 
is not the right answer. The proper mixture of combat and combat support troops 
necessary to restore balance to the fragile and tumultuous border region is 
required.  
The Lebanese government needs to increase its use of public relations, 
PSYOP and messaging. Hizbullah is adept in distributing its message, especially 
through its organization-run television station. The Lebanese government needs 
to counter Hizbullah‘s messaging and provide information, assistance and 
support through its own media channels.  
The United States can assist Lebanon through sanctions on the countries 
that support Hizbullah, specifically Iran and Syria. The sanctions are necessary 
to maintain economic and developmental hardship on countries that assist and 
harbor terrorists.  
U.S. efforts need to address all of these issues. It needs to focus all 
elements of national power that are resident within Lebanon. Military elements 
training with the LAF need to develop training plans which identify indirect 
methods for waging an irregular warfare campaign against Hizbullah. This IW 
centric FID plan needs to address the pertinent issues facing the LAF. Lessons 
learned from past conflicts where the population was the most important aspect 
of the conflict need to be studied and exploited. Britain and Northern Ireland are 
terrific examples; the U.S. action is Vietnam is not. Additionally the U.S. and its 
allies need to raise the stakes for Syria and Iran for continued support to 
Hizbullah. 
Lebanon is a relatively new country and its struggle against Hizbullah has 
lasted too long. Lebanon needs to address the grievances of its minority 
population to increase economic development and offer more political 
opportunities. The LAF need to secure the border region, provide stability to the 
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population and remove the need to have a militant wing within Hizbullah. These 
actions will take time, but can be accomplished with enough national will and 
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